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When applied to the same game, probability theory and game theory can disagree on calculated
values of the Fisher information, the log likelihood function, entropy gradients, the rank and Jaco-
bian of variable transforms, and even the dimensionality and volume of the underlying probability
parameter spaces. These differences arise as probability theory employs structure preserving isomor-
phic mappings when constructing strategy spaces to analyze games. In contrast, game theory uses
weaker mappings which change some of the properties of the underlying probability distributions
within the mixed strategy space. In this paper, we explore how using strong isomorphic mappings
to define game strategy spaces can alter rational outcomes in simple games, and might resolve some
of the paradoxes of game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
One possibly fruitful way to gain insight into the para-
doxes of game theory is to show that probability the-
ory and game theory analyze simple games differently.
It would be expected of course that these two well de-
veloped fields should always produce consistent results.
However, we will show in this paper that probability the-
ory and game theory can produce contradictory results
when applied to even simple games. These differences
arise as these two fields construct mixed and behavioural
strategy spaces differently.
The mixed strategy space of game theory is con-
structed, according to von Neumann and Morgenstern
[1], by first making a listing of every possible combina-
tion of moves that players might make and of all possi-
ble information states that players might possess. This
complete embodiment of information then allows every
move combination to be mapped into a probability sim-
plex whereby each player’s mixed strategy probability
parameters belong to “disjoint but exhaustive alterna-
tives, . . . subject to the [usual normalization] conditions
. . . and to no others.” [1]. The resulting unconstrained
mixed strategy space is then a “complete set” of all pos-
sible probability distributions that might describe the
moves of a game [1–5]. Further, the absence of any con-
straints other than for normalization ensures “trembles”
or “fluctuations” are always present within the mixed
strategy space so every possible pure strategy probabil-
ity distribution is played with non-zero (but possibly in-
finitesimal) probability [6]. Together, these properties of
the mixed strategy space—a complete set of “contained”
probability distributions, no additional constraints, and
ever present trembles—lead to inconsistencies with prob-
ability theory.
In constructing a mixed strategy space, probability
theory first examines how subsidiary probability distri-
butions can be “contained” within a mixed space and
whether the properties of the probability distributions
are altered as a result. Probability theory uses isomor-
phisms to implement mappings of one probability space
into another space. An isomorphism is a structure pre-
serving mapping from one space to another space. In
abstract algebra for instance, an isomorphism between
vector spaces is a bijective (one-to-one and onto) linear
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mapping between the spaces with the implication that
two vector spaces are isomorphic if and only if their di-
mensionality is identical [7]. When the preservation of
structure is exact, then calculations within either space
must give identical results. Conversely, if the degree of
structure preservation is less than exact, then differences
can arise between calculations performed in each space.
It is thus crucial to examine the fidelity of the “contain-
ment” mappings used to construct the mixed spaces of
game theory.
Probability theory defines isomorphic probability
spaces as follows. First, a probability space P =
{Ω, σ, P} consists of a set of events Ω, a sigma-algebra
of all subsets of those events σ, and a probability mea-
sure defined over the events P . Two probability spaces
P = {Ω, σ, P} and P ′ = {Ω′, σ′, P ′} are said to be strictly
isomorphic if there is a bijective map f : Ω → Ω′ which
exactly preserves assigned probabilities, so for all e ∈ Ω
we have P (e) = P ′[f(e)]. A slight weakening of this def-
inition defines an isomorphism as a bijective mapping f
of some unit probability subset of Ω onto a unit probabil-
ity subset of Ω′. That is, the weakened mapping ignores
null event subsets of zero probability. This definition and
equivalent ones are given in Refs. [8–10]. In particular,
we note that strong isomorphisms between source and
target probability spaces require they have identical di-
mensionality and tangent spaces [11].
The mixed strategy space of game theory “contains”
different probability distributions with many possessing
different dimensionality (according to probability the-
ory). Their altered dimensionality within the mixed
space can alter those computed outcomes dependent on
dimensionality. A simple functional illustration of this
process can make this clear. A 1-dimensional function
f(x) can be embedded within a 2-dimensional function
g(x, y) in two ways: using constraints g(x, y0) = f(x), or
limits limy→y0 g(x, y) = f(x). In either case, many of the
properties of the source function f(x) are preserved, but
not necessarily all of them. In particular, these different
methods alter gradient optimization calculations. That
is, the gradient is properly calculated when constraints
are used, f ′(x) = g′(x, y0), but not when a limit process
is used, f ′(x) 6= limy→y0 ∇g(x, y) (where ∇ indicates a
gradient operator).
In this paper, we will show that exactly the same dis-
crepancies arise when probability theory and game theory
are applied to simple probability spaces, and that these
discrepancies can be significant. It is useful to indicate
the magnitude of these discrepancies here to motivate the
paper (with full details given in later sections below). We
2consider a simple card game with two potentially corre-
lated variables x, y ∈ {0, 1} with joint probability dis-
tribution Pxy. In the case where x and y are perfectly
correlated, probability theory (denoted by P) and game
theory (denoted by G) respectively assign different di-
mensions to both the Fisher information matrix (F ) and
the gradient of the log Likelihood function (∇L), and can
disagree on the value of the gradient of the joint entropy
at some points (∇Exy):
P G
dim(F ) 1 3
dim(∇L) 1 3
|∇E| 0 ∞.
(1)
These fields also disagree on the probability space gradi-
ents of both the normalization condition (P00 +P11 = 1)
and the requirement that the joint entropy equates to the
marginal entropy (Exy − Ex = 0):
P G
∇ (P00 + P11) 0 6= 0
∇ (Exy − Ex) 0 6= 0.
(2)
Should these fields model a change of variable within this
game, they further disagree on the rank of the transform
matrix (A), and on the invertibility of the Jacobian ma-
trix (J):
P G
Rank(A) 1 2
J Singular Invertible.
(3)
These fields even disagree on the dimension (d) and vol-
ume (V ) of the minimal probability space used to analyze
the game:
P G
d 1 3
V 1 16 .
(4)
The differences between game theory and probability the-
ory arise due to the different use of isomorphic mappings
to construct mixed strategy spaces.
In Section II we show the necessity for considering iso-
morphic probability spaces using examples ranging from
simple dice games to bivariate normal distributions. Sec-
tion III collects results for the mixed and behavioural
strategy spaces of a simple two-stage game and again
establishes the necessity for taking account of isomor-
phic probability distributions. We apply these results in
Section IV to optimizing highly nonlinear random func-
tions over a decision tree involving correlated variables.
This section is then generalized and applied to a strategic
game in Section V. Throughout, we place the details of
many calculations within the Appendices to show work-
ing and avoid cluttering the paper.
II. OPTIMIZATION AND ISOMORPHIC
PROBABILITY SPACES
In this section, we introduce the need to use iso-
morphic mappings when embedding probability spaces
within mixed spaces.
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FIG. 1: Three alternate dice with different numbers of sides.
A coin with sides A and B appearing with respective proba-
bilities a and b, a triangle with faces A,B and C occurring
with respective probabilities a, b and c, and a square die with
faces A,B,C and D each occurring with respective probabili-
ties a, b, c and d.
A. Isomorphic dice
Consider the three alternate dice shown in Fig. 1 rep-
resenting a 2-sided coin, a 3-sided triangle, and a 4-sided
square. Faces are labeled with capital letters and the
probabilities of each face appearing are labeled with the
corresponding small letter. The corresponding probabil-
ity spaces defined by these die are
Pcoin =
{
x ∈ {A,B}, {a, b}}
Ptriangle =
{
x ∈ {A,B,C}, {a, b, c}}
Psquare =
{
x ∈ {A,B,C,D}, {a, b, c, d}}. (5)
Here the required sigma-algebras are not listed, and each
of these spaces are subject to the usual normalization
conditions. For notational convenience we sometimes
write (p1, p2, p3, p4) = (a, b, c, d) and denote the number
of sides of each respective die as n ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
We now wish to optimize a nonlinear function over
these spaces, and we choose a function which cannot
be optimized using standard approaches in game theory.
The chosen function is
F = V 2Ex, (6)
with
V =
∫
space
dv
Ex = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi, (7)
where V is the volume of each respective probability pa-
rameter space and Ex is the marginal entropy of each
3space [12]. We will complete this optimization in three
different ways, two of which will be consistent with each
other and inconsistent with the third.
As a first pass at optimizing the function F , we simply
maximize F within each probability space and then com-
pare the optimal outcomes to determine the best achiev-
able outcome. As is well understood, the entropy of a set
of n events is maximized when those events are equiprob-
able giving a maximum entropy of Ex,max = logn. Using
the volume results of Eqs. A2—A4, the function F takes
maximum values in the three probability spaces of
Fcoin, max = log 2
Ftriangle, max =
log 3
4
Fsquare, max =
log 4
36
. (8)
Comparing these outcomes makes it clear that the best
that can be achieved is to use a coin with equiprobable
faces.
The second method uses isomorphisms to map all of
the three incommensurate source spaces into a single tar-
get space. We choose our mappings as follows:
P ′coin =
{
x ∈ {A,B,C,D}, {a, b, c, d}}∣∣
(cd)=(00)
P ′triangle =
{
x ∈ {A,B,C,D}, {a, b, c, d}}∣∣
d=0
P ′square =
{
x ∈ {A,B,C,D}, {a, b, c, d}}. (9)
Here, while all probability spaces share a common event
set and probability distribution, the isomorphic map-
pings impose constraints on the P ′coin and P ′triangle spaces.
The constraints arise from mapping the null sets of zero
probability from each source space to the corresponding
events of the enlarged target space. The target proba-
bility space is shown in Fig. 2 where the normalization
condition d = 1 − a − b − c is used. The points cor-
responding to the probability spaces of the coin P ′coin
are mapped along the line a + b = 1 with constraint
(c, d) = (0, 0). Those points corresponding to the prob-
ability spaces of the triangle P ′triangle are mapped along
the surface a + b + c = 1 with constraint d = 0. Fi-
nally, the probability spaces corresponding to the square
P ′square fill the volume a+b+c+d = 1 and are not subject
to any other constraint.
The interesting point about the target space is that
many points, e.g. (a, b, c, d) = (12 ,
1
2 , 0, 0), lie in all of the
probability spaces of the coin, triangle, and square die
and are only distinguished by which constraints are act-
ing. That is, when this point is subject to the constraint
(c, d) = (0, 0), then it corresponds to the probability
space P ′coin (and not to any other). Conversely, when this
same point is subject to an imposed constraint d = 0 then
it corresponds to the probability space P ′triangle. Finally,
when no constraints apply then, and only then does this
point correspond to the probability space of the square
P ′square. This means that it is not the probability values
possessed by a point which determines its corresponding
probability space but the probability values in combina-
tion with the constraints acting at that point.
It is now straightforward to use the isomorphically con-
strained target space to maximize the function F over all
embedded probability spaces using standard constrained
optimization techniques. For instance, to optimize F
0
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FIG. 2: The target space containing points corresponding to
the probability spaces respectively of the coin P ′coin along the
line a + b = 1 with constraint (c, d) = (0, 0) (heavy line),
of the triangle P ′triangle along the surface a + b + c = 1 with
constraint d = 0 (hashed surface), and of the square P ′square
filling the volume a + b + c + d = 1 (filled polygon). Note
that points such as (a, b, c) = (0.5, 0.5, 0) correspond to all
three probability spaces and are only distinguished by which
constraints are acting.
over points corresponding to the coin and subject to
the constraint (c, d) = (0, 0) then either simply resolve
the constraint via setting c = d = 0 before the opti-
mization begins, or simply evaluate the gradient of F
at all points (a, b, 0, 0) in the direction of the unit vec-
tor 1√
2
(−1, 1, 0, 0) lying along the line a + b = 1. (See
Eq. A6.) An optimization over all three isomorphic con-
straints leads to the same outcomes as obtained previ-
ously in Eq. 8. This completes the second optimization
analysis and as promised, it is consistent with the results
of the first.
The same is not true of the third optimization ap-
proach which produces results inconsistent with the first
two. The reason we present this method is that it is
in common use in game theory. The third optimization
method commences by noting that the probability space
of the square is complete in that it already “contains” all
of probability spaces of the triangle and of the coin. This
allows a square probability space to mimic a coin proba-
bility space by simply taking the limit (c, d) → (0, 0).
Similarly, the square mimics the triangle through the
limit d → 0. In turn, this means that an optimization
over the space of the square is effectively an optimization
over every choice of space within the square. Specifically,
game theory discards constraints to model the choice be-
tween contained probability spaces. This optimization
over the points of the square has already been completed
above. When optimizing the function F over the uncon-
strained points corresponding to the square, the maxi-
mum value is F = log(4)/36 at (a, b, c, d) = (14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ),
and according to game theory, this is the best outcome
when players have a choice between the coin, the triangle,
or the square.
The optimum result obtained by the third optimization
method, that used by game theory, conflicts with those
4found by the previous two methods as commonly used in
probability theory. The difference arises as game theory
models a choice between probability spaces by making
players uncertain about the values of their probability
parameters within any probability space. Consequently,
their probability parameters are always subject to in-
finitesimal fluctuations, i.e. c > 0+ or d > 0+ always.
These fluctuations alter the dimensions of the space
which impacts on the calculation of the volume V and
alters the calculated gradient of the entropy. Game the-
ory eschews the role of isomorphism constraints within
probability spaces on the grounds that any such con-
straints restrict player uncertainty and hence their ability
to choose between different probability spaces. The prob-
ability parameter fluctuations mean that players have ac-
cess to all possible probability dimensions at all times so
a single mixed space is the appropriate way to model the
choice between contained probability spaces. In contrast,
probability theory holds that the choice between proba-
bility spaces introduces player uncertainty about which
space to use, but specifically does not introduce uncer-
tainty into the parameters within any individual prob-
ability space. As a result, probability theory employs
isomorphic constraints to ensure that the properties of
each embedded probability space within the mixed space
are unchanged.
The upshot is that a game theorist cannot evaluate
the Entropy (or uncertainty) gradient of a coin toss
while considering alternate die because uncertainty about
which dice is used bleeds into the Entropy calculation.
However, the probability theorist will distinguish be-
tween their uncertainty about which face of the coin will
appear and their uncertainty about which dice is being
used.
B. Continuous bivariate Normal spaces
The above results are general. When source probabil-
ity spaces are embedded within target probability spaces,
then the use of isomorphic mapping constraints will pre-
serve all properties of the embedded spaces. Conversely,
when constraints are not used then some of the properties
of the embedded spaces will not be preserved in general.
We illustrate this now using normally distributed contin-
uous random variables.
Consider two normally distributed continuous indepen-
dent random variables x and y with x, y ∈ (−∞,∞).
When independent, these variables have a joint proba-
bility distribution Pxy which is continuous and differen-
tiable in six variables, Pxy(x, µx, σx, y, µy, σy) where the
respective means are µx and µy and the variances are σ
2
x
and σ2y. The marginal distributions are Px(x, µx, σx) and
Py(y, µy, σy). (See Eq. A7.)
The independent joint distribution Pxy can now be em-
bedded into an enlarged distribution representing two po-
tentially correlated normally distributed variables x and
y. This enlarged distribution P ′xy(x, µx, σx, y, µy, σy, ρ)
differs from Pxy in its dependence on the correlation pa-
rameter ρxy = ρ with ρ ∈ (−1, 1). This distribution
is continuous and differentiable in seven variables. (See
Eq. A9.) An isomorphic embedding requires that the
unit probability subset of Pxy be mapped onto the unit
probability subset of P ′xy and this is achieved by imposing
an external constraint that ρ = 0 in the enlarged space.
Hence, we expect P ′xy
∣∣
ρ=0
= Pxy. It is readily confirmed
that when the isomorphism constraint is imposed on the
enlarged distribution all properties are preserved, while
this is not the case in the absence of the constraint. The
probability distributions must satisfy a number of gradi-
ent relations (with the gradient operator ∇ a function of
seven variables), for instance
∇ [P ′xy − P ′xP ′y]∣∣ρ=0 = 0
lim
ρ→0
∇ [P ′xy − P ′xP ′y] 6= 0
∇
[
P ′x|y − P ′x
]∣∣∣
ρ=0
= 0
lim
ρ→0
∇
[
P ′x|y − P ′x
]
6= 0. (10)
(See Eq. A14.) Similarly, the expectations of functions
of the x and y variables must also satisfy a number of
gradient relations (with the gradient operator ∇ now a
function of five variables), for instance
∇ [〈xy〉′ − 〈x〉′〈y〉′]|ρ=0 = 0
lim
ρ→0
∇ [〈xy〉′ − 〈x〉′〈y〉′] 6= 0. (11)
(See Eq. A16.)
H00L, a
H01L, b
H10L, c
H11L, d
FIG. 3: A four-sided square probability space where joint vari-
ables x and y take values (x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
with respective probabilities (a, b, c, d).
C. Joint probability space optimization
We will briefly now examine isomorphisms between the
joint probability spaces of two arbitrarily correlated ran-
dom variables. In particular, we consider two random
variables x, y as appear on the square dice of Fig. 3 with
probability space
Psquare =
{
(x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)},
{a, b, c, d}}. (12)
The correlation between the x and y variables is
ρxy =
〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉
σxσy
=
ad− bc√
(c+ d)(a+ b)(b + d)(a+ c)
. (13)
Here, σx and σy are the respective standard deviations
of the x and y variables.
5The space Psquare of course contains many embedded
or contained spaces. We will separately consider the case
where x and y are perfectly correlated, and where they
are independent. As noted previously, there are two dis-
tinct ways for these spaces to be contained within Psquare,
namely using isomorphism constraints or using limit pro-
cesses. These two ways give the respective definitions for
the perfectly correlated case
Pcorr =
{
(x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)},
{a, b, c, d}}∣∣
b=c=0
P ′corr = lim
(bc)→(00)
{
(x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)},
{a, b, c, d}} (14)
and for the independent case
Pind =
{
(x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)},
{a, b, c, d}}∣∣
ad=bc
P ′ind = lim
ad→bc
{
(x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)},
{a, b, c, d}}. (15)
Here, all spaces satisfy the normalization constraint
a + b + c + d = 1, which we typically resolve using
d = 1 − a − b − c. Evaluating any function dependent
on a gradient or completing an optimization task using
either isomorphic constraints or limit processes can nat-
urally result in different outcomes as we now illustrate.
1. Perfectly correlated probability spaces
We first consider the case where the x and y variables
are perfectly correlated in the spaces Pcorr with isomor-
phism constraints or P ′corr using limit processes.
The maximum achievable joint entropy [12] for our
two perfectly correlated variables obviously occurs at the
point where they are equiprobable. This can be found by
evaluating the gradient of the joint entropy function
Exy(a, b, c) = −
∑
xy
Pxy logPxy. (16)
In the space Pcorr, the gradient optimization
∇Exy|b=c=0 = 0 locates an optimum point at
(a, b, c, d) = (12 , 0, 0,
1
2 ), while in the space P ′corr
the optimum at ∇Exy = 0 locates the point
(a, b, c, d) = (14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ). (See Eq. A19.)
The Fisher Information is defined in terms of probabil-
ity space gradients as the amount of information obtained
about a probability parameter from observing any event
[12]. It is a matrix Fij with elements i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
In the isomorphically constrained space Pcorr, the Fisher
Information is a scalar via
Fij |b=c=0 = F11 = 1
a(1− a) , (17)
equal to the inverse of the Variance as required. A very
different result is obtained in the unconstrained space
P ′corr where the Fisher Information is a much larger ma-
trix. (See Eq. A20.)
Probability parameter gradients also allow estimation
of probability parameters by locating points where the
Log Likelihood function is maximized ∇ logL = 0 [12].
This evaluation takes very different forms in the isomor-
phically constrained space Pcorr and the unconstrained
space P ′corr as shown in Eq. A24. Coincidentally how-
ever, in our case the same estimated outcomes can be
achieved in both spaces. For example, if an observation
of n trials shows na instances of (x, y) = (0, 0) and n−na
instances of (x, y) = (1, 1) then both constrained and
unconstrained approaches give the best estimates of the
probability parameters of (a, b, c, d) = (na
n
, 0, 0, 1− na
n
).
Finally, when x and y are perfectly correlated it is
necessarily the case that expectations satisfy 〈x〉 − 〈y〉 =
0, that variances satisfy V (x) − V (y) = 0, that the joint
entropy is equal to the entropy of each variable so Exy −
Ex = 0, and that finally, the correlation between these
variables satisfies ρxy−1 = 0. All of these properties lead
to gradient relations in the Pcorr and P ′corr spaces of:
∇ [〈x〉 − 〈y〉] |b=c=0 = 0
lim
(bc)→(00)
∇ [〈x〉 − 〈y〉] = −bˆ+ cˆ
∇ [V (x)− V (y)] |b=c=0 = 0
lim
(bc)→(00)
∇ [V (x) − V (y)] = (1 − 2a)bˆ− (1 − 2a)cˆ
∇ [Exy − Ex] |b=c=0 = 0
lim
(bc)→(00)
∇ [Exy − Ex] 6= undefined
∇ρxy|b=c=0 = 0
∇ρxy 6= 0. (18)
Obviously, taking the limit (b, c)→ (0, 0) does not reduce
the limit equations to the required relations. (See Eq.
A25.)
2. Independent probability spaces
We next consider the case where the x and y variables
are independent using the spaces Pind with isomorphism
constraints or P ′ind with limit processes.
When random variables are independent, then their
joint probability distribution is separable for every al-
lowable probability parameter of Pind or P ′ind. This
means the gradient of this separability property must
be invariant across both probability spaces. That is,
we must have both Pxy = PxPy everywhere and hence
∇ [Pxy − PxPy] = 0. Similarly, separability requires we
also satisfy ∇ [〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉] = 0. Further, every inde-
pendent space must have conditional probabilities equal
to marginal probabilities and so satisfy ∇ [Px|y − Px] =
0. Finally, two independent variables have joint entropy
equal to the sum of the individual entropies so every in-
dependent space must satisfy ∇ [Exy − Ex − Ey ] = 0.
These relations evaluate differently in either Pind with
isomorphism constraints or P ′ind with limit processes. We
have:
∇ [Pxy(00)− Px(0)Py(0)] |ad=bc = 0
lim
ad→bc
∇ [Pxy(00)− Px(0)Py(0)] = lim
ad→bc
∇(ad− bc) 6= 0
∇ [〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉] |ad=bc = 0
lim
ad→bc
∇ [〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉] = lim
ad→bc
∇(ad− bc) 6= 0
∇ [Px|y(0|0)− Px(0)] |ad=bc = 0
60
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FIG. 4: A schematic representation where a three dimensional
target probability strategy space (p, q, r) embeds respectively
several one dimensional probability spaces associated with per-
fectly correlated variables (lines, upper left and lower right),
and a two dimensional probability space associated with in-
dependent variables (plane, middle). An exact isomorphism
preserves the respective original tangent spaces shown via one
and two dimensional axes offset in background. A weak iso-
morphism fails to preserve the original tangent spaces of the
source probability distributions and assigns the three dimen-
sional tangent space of the target space to every embedded
distribution (as shown in foreground slightly offset from each
embedded space).
lim
ad→bc
∇ [Px|y(0|0)− Px(0)] = lim
ad→bc
∇
[
ad− bc
a+ c
]
6= 0
∇ [Exy − Ex − Ey] |ad=bc = 0
lim
ad→bc
∇ [Exy − Ex − Ey] 6= 0. (19)
(See Eqs. A27 to A29.)
D. Discussion
There are two approaches to optimization over prob-
ability spaces presented here. Probability theory uses
isomorphic constraints to exactly preserve the proper-
ties of embedded probability spaces and then compares
these exactly calculated values. Game theory eschews the
use of isomorphic constraints and in effect, argues that
any uncertainty about which probability space to choose
bleeds into many calculations within a given space and
alters the calculated outcomes.
When probability spaces are represented as geometries,
then it is expected that at least some of the properties
of the probability space will be rendered in geometric
terms. How these geometrical properties are preserved
when a probability space is embedded within another
is the question. Probability theory requires the exact
preservation of all properties of every source space and
this is achieved by imposing different constraints on dif-
ferent points within the target space. Game theory in
contrast, imposes a single target space geometry onto
every source probability space. One way to picture this
0
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FIG. 5: Every point within the (p, q, r) probability space shown
specifies a particular state of correlation ρxy(p, q, r) between
the x and y variables. We show here several lines and sur-
faces of constant correlation taking values from top left to bot-
tom right of ρxy = +1,+0.75,+0.25, 0,−0.25,−0.75,−1. The
optimization of expectations at any point (p, q, r) must take
account of correlated changes between x and y.
is shown in Fig. 4. This figure shows how probability
theory exactly preserves the dimensionality and tangent
spaces of embedded probability spaces, while game the-
ory overwrites these properties of the embedded spaces
with the corresponding properties of the mixed space.
In probability theory, the different isomorphism con-
straints and tangent spaces acting at each point de-
fine non-intersecting lines and surfaces within the target
space. Some of these are shown in Fig. 5 representing
the (p, q, r) simplex of the two potentially correlated x
and y variables (this behavioural space is defined in the
next section). Here, each state of correlation is a con-
stant and cannot vary during an optimization analysis
so an optimization procedure must sequentially take ac-
count of every possible correlation state between these
variables, setting ρxy = ρ for all ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. These op-
timum points can then be compared to determine which
correlation state between x and y returns the best value.
Unsurprisingly, these two distinct approaches can
sometimes generate conflicting results.
III. MIXED AND BEHAVIOURAL STRATEGY
SPACES
The different approaches of probability theory and
game theory to isomorphic embeddings also impacts on
the definitions of mixed and behavioural strategy spaces.
As usual, we will compare these spaces both with and
without isomorphism constraints. Our focus will be on a
simple decision problem involving two random variables
x, y ∈ {0, 1} where y is potentially conditioned on x as
shown in the behavioural strategy decision tree of Fig. 6.
7     1-p                                    p
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FIG. 6: A simple decision tree where potentially independent
or correlated variables x and y take values {0, 1} with the prob-
abilities shown. This defines the (p, q, r) behavioural probabil-
ity space.
A. Mixed strategy space PM
The mixed strategy space is denoted PM , and deter-
mines the choice of x via a probability distribution α
while the respective choices of y on the left branch of the
decision tree yl and on the right branch yr are determined
by an independent probability distribution β according
to the following table:
(yl, yr) = (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(x, y) β0 β1 β2 β3
α0 (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1)
α1 (1, 0) (1, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1).
(20)
The mixed strategy simplex for each player is respec-
tively SX = {(α0, α1) ∈ R2+ :
∑
j αj = 1} and SY =
{(β0, β1, β2, β3) ∈ R4+ :
∑
j βj = 1}. The associated
tangent spaces are TX = {z ∈ R2 : ∑j zj = 0} and
T Y = {z ∈ R4 :∑j zj = 0}, equivalent to every possible
positive or negative fluctuation in the probabilities of the
the pure strategies of each player. The joint probability
distribution Pxy(x, y) for x and y is
Pxy(0, 0) = (1 − α1)(1− β2 − β3)
Pxy(0, 1) = (1 − α1)(β2 + β3)
Pxy(1, 0) = α1(1− β1 − β3)
Pxy(1, 1) = α1(β1 + β3). (21)
Here, we have used normalization constraints to elimi-
nate α0 and β0. The expectations of the x and y variables
are given by
〈x〉 = α1
〈y〉 = β2 + β3 + α1(β1 − β2)
〈xy〉 = α1(β1 + β3), (22)
while their variances are
V (x) = α1(1− α1)
V (y) = [β2 + β3 + α1(β1 − β2)]×
× [1− β2 − β3 − α1(β1 − β2)] . (23)
For completeness, we note the marginal and joint en-
tropies are
Ex = −(1− α1) log(1− α1)− α1 logα1
Ey = −[1− β2 − β3 + α1(β2 − β1)]×
log[1− β2 − β3 + α1(β2 − β1)]
−[β2 + β3 − α1(β2 − β1)]×
log[β2 + β3 − α1(β2 − β1)]
Exy = −(1− α1)(1 − β2 − β3) log[(1− α1)(1 − β2 − β3)]
−(1− α1)(β2 + β3) log[(1− α1)(β2 + β3)]
−α1(1− β1 − β3) log[α1(1− β1 − β3)]
−α1(β1 + β3) log[α1(β1 + β3)]. (24)
Naturally, the mixed strategy probability space can
model any state of correlation between x and y with the
correlation give by
ρxy(α1, β1, β2, β3) =
√
α1(1− α1)(β1 − β2)√
〈y〉 [1− 〈y〉] . (25)
Then, when x and y are perfectly correlated we have
ρxy = 1 requiring the constraints β1 = 1 and β0 = β2 =
β3 = 0. When x and y are perfectly anti-correlated we
have ρxy = −1 requiring the constraints β2 = 1 and
β0 = β1 = β3 = 0. Finally, when x and y are independent
we have ρxy = 0 requiring the constraint β1 = β2.
B. Behavioural strategy space PB
The behavioural strategy probability space [4] is de-
noted PB and is parameterized as shown in Fig. 6.
The behavioural strategy space for the players is SXY =
{(p, q, r) ∈ R3+ : 0 ≤ p, q, r ≤ 1} after taking ac-
count of normalization. The associated tangent space
is TXY = {z ∈ R3}. The probability Pxy(x, y) that x
and y take on their respective values is
Pxy(0, 0) = (1 − p)(1− q)
Pxy(0, 1) = (1 − p)q
Pxy(1, 0) = p(1− r)
Pxy(1, 1) = pr. (26)
This distribution gives the following expected values:
〈x〉 = p
〈y〉 = q + p(r − q)
〈xy〉 = pr, (27)
while the variances of the x and y variables are
V (x) = p(1− p)
V (y) = [q + p(r − q)] [1− q − p(r − q)] . (28)
The marginal and joint entropies between the x and y
variables are
Ex = −(1− p) log(1− p)− p log p
Ey = −[(1− p)(1− q) + p(1− r)] ×
log[(1 − p)(1− q) + p(1− r)]
−[(1− p)q + pr] log[(1− p)q + pr]
Exy = −(1− p)(1− q) log[(1− p)(1− q)]
−(1− p)q log[(1− p)q]
−p(1− r) log[p(1− r)]
−pr log[pr]. (29)
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Parameters α1, β1, β2, β3 p, q, r α1 p
Dimensions 4 3 1 1
∇ operator ∂
∂α1
αˆ1 +
∂
∂β1
βˆ1 +
∂
∂β2
βˆ2 +
∂
∂β3
βˆ3
∂
∂p
pˆ+ ∂
∂q
qˆ + ∂
∂r
rˆ ∂
∂α1
αˆ1
∂
∂p
pˆ
Gradient limβ1→1∇(.) lim(q,r)→(0,1)∇(.) ∇ ∇
Probability Conservation
∇ [Pxy(0, 0) + Pxy(1, 1)] α1βˆ1 − (1− α1)βˆ2 + (2α1 − 1)βˆ3 −(1− p)qˆ + prˆ 0 0
∇ [Pxy(0, 1) + Pxy(1, 0)] −α1βˆ1 + (1− α1)βˆ2 − (2α1 − 1)βˆ3 (1− p)qˆ − prˆ 0 0
Conditionals
∇Px|y(0|0)
α1
1−α1
(βˆ1 + βˆ3)
p
1−p
rˆ 0 0
∇Px|y(0|1)
1−α1
1α1
(βˆ2 + βˆ3)
1−p
p
qˆ 0 0
Expectations
∇〈x〉 αˆ1 pˆ αˆ1 pˆ
∇〈y〉 αˆ1 + α1βˆ1 + (1− α1)βˆ2 + βˆ3 pˆ+ (1− p)qˆ + prˆ αˆ1 pˆ
∇〈xy〉 αˆ1 + α1βˆ1 + α1βˆ3 pˆ+ prˆ αˆ1 pˆ
Variance
∇ [V (x) + V (y)− 2cov(x, y)] −α1βˆ1 + (1− α1)βˆ2 + (1− 2α1)βˆ3 (1− p)qˆ − prˆ 0 0
Entropy
∇ [Exy −Ex] 6= 0 6= 0 0 0
Correlation
∇ρxy 6= 0 6= 0 0 0
ρxy = 0 PM PB PM |β1=β2 PB|r=q
Parameters α1, β1, β2, β3 p, q, r α1, β¯ = β1 + β3 p, q
Dimensions 4 3 2 2
∇ operator ∂
∂α1
αˆ1 +
∂
∂β1
βˆ1 +
∂
∂β2
βˆ2 +
∂
∂β3
βˆ3
∂
∂p
pˆ+ ∂
∂q
qˆ + ∂
∂r
rˆ ∂
∂α1
αˆ1 +
∂
∂β¯
ˆ¯β ∂
∂p
pˆ+ ∂
∂q
qˆ
Gradient limβ2→β1 ∇(.) limr→q∇(.) ∇ ∇
Probability
∇ [Pxy(0, 0) − Px(0)Py(0)] α1(1− α1)(βˆ1 − βˆ2) p(1− p)(rˆ − qˆ) 0 0
∇ [Pxy(0, 1) − Px(0)Py(1)] α1(1− α1)(βˆ2 − βˆ1) p(1− p)(qˆ − rˆ) 0 0
∇ [Pxy(1, 0) − Px(1)Py(0)] α1(1− α1)(βˆ2 − βˆ1) p(1− p)(qˆ − rˆ) 0 0
∇ [Pxy(1, 1) − Px(1)Py(1)] α1(1− α1)(βˆ1 − βˆ2) p(1− p)(rˆ − qˆ) 0 0
Conditionals
∇
[
Px|y(0|0) − Px(0)
]
α1(1−α1)
1−β1−β3
(βˆ1 − βˆ2)
p(1−p)
(1−q)
(rˆ − qˆ) 0 0
∇
[
Px|y(0|1) − Px(0)
]
α1(1−α1)
β1+β3
(βˆ2 − βˆ1)
p(1−p)
q
(qˆ − rˆ) 0 0
Expectation
∇ [〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉] α1(1− α1)(βˆ1 − βˆ2) p(1− p)(rˆ − qˆ) 0 0
Entropy
∇ [Exy −Ex − Ey] 6= 0 6= 0 0 0
Correlation
∇ρxy 6= 0 6= 0 0 0
TABLE I: A comparison of calculated results for mixed PM and behavioural PB strategy spaces with those same spaces when
subject to isomorphic constraints. We examine points where respectively the x and y variables are first perfectly correlated
with ρxy = 1 and then independent with ρxy = 0. In the unconstrained behavioural spaces, all quantities are evaluated at
points satisfying limβ1→1 or lim(q,r)→(0,1) when ρxy = 1, and at points satisfying limβ2→β1 or limr→q when ρxy = 0. The
isomorphically constrained spaces are respectively indicated by PM |β1=1 and PB|(q,r)=(0,1) for the perfectly correlated case, and
PM |β1=β2 and PB|r=q when the variables are independent. Game theory and probability theory assign different dimensionality
and tangent spaces to these cases. Many calculated results differ between these spaces.
9The behavioural probability space also allows modeling
any arbitrary state of correlation between the x and y
variables where the correlation between x and y is
ρxy =
√
p(1− p)(r − q)√
[q + p(r − q)] [1− q − p(r − q)] . (30)
Then, x and y are perfectly correlated at ρxy(p, 0, 1) = 1,
perfectly anti-correlated at ρxy(p, 1, 0) = −1, and uncor-
related if either p = 0 or p = 1 or q = r giving ρxy = 0.
Hence, the decision tree of Fig. 6 encompasses every pos-
sible state of correlation between x and y, and thus it can
be used to perform a complete analysis.
C. Isomorphic Mixed and Behavioural Spaces
The mixed PM and behavioural PB strategy spaces
contain embedded probability spaces where x and y are
respectively perfectly correlated, independent, or par-
tially correlated. As previously, we will now perform a
comparison of probability spaces, both with and without
isomorphic constraints, for various correlation states be-
tween the x and y variables. That is, we will compare
the mixed strategy space PM and behavioural strategy
space PB with isomorphism constrained mixed and be-
havioural strategy spaces as indicated using the following
notation.
The case of perfectly correlated x and y variables is
modeled by the spaces
limβ1→1 PM mixed
PM |β1=1 constrained mixed
lim(q,r)→(0,1)PB behavioural
PB|(q,r)=(0,1) constrained behavioural
(31)
In these spaces we expect all of the following to hold:
• ∇ [Pxy(0, 0) + Pxy(1, 1)] = 0,
• ∇ [Pxy(0, 1) + Pxy(1, 0)] = 0,
• ∇ [Px|y(0|0)] = 0,
• ∇ [Px|y(0|1)] = 0,
• ∇ [〈x〉 − 〈y〉] = 0
• ∇ [〈x〉 − 〈xy〉] = 0
• ∇ [〈y〉 − 〈xy〉] = 0
• ∇[V (x− y)] = ∇ [V (x) + V (y)− 2cov(x, y)] = 0
• ∇ [Exy − Ex] = 0.
Alternately, when x and y are independent, the relevant
spaces are
limβ1→β2 PM mixed
PM |β1=β2 constrained mixed
limr→q PB behavioural
PB|r=q constrained behavioural
(32)
In all these spaces, the probability distributions satisfy
• ∇ [Pxy − PxPy] = 0
• ∇ [Px|y − Px] = 0
• ∇ [〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉] = 0
• ∇ [Exy − Ex − Ey] = 0.
Table I records whether each of the expected relations
is satisfied for each of the mixed and behavioural spaces
when they are either unconstrained, or isomorphically
constrained. As might be expected, the results indicate
that the weak isomorphisms used to construct the mixed
and behavioural spaces of game theory are not able to re-
produce necessarily true results from probability theory.
Hence, the rational player of game theory is unable to
reliably reproduce results from probability theory. These
differences between game theory and probability theory
need to be resolved.
IV. OPTIMIZING SIMPLE DECISION TREES
We now turn to consider how the differences between
probability theory and game theory influence decision
tree optimization. We consider the usual two poten-
tially correlated random variables depicted in Fig. 6 and
will use both the unconstrained behavioural probability
space PB and the isomorphically constrained behavioural
spaces PB|ρxy=ρ for every value of the correlation state
ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Our goal is to present an optimization prob-
lem in which a rational player following the rules of game
theory cannot achieve the payoff outcomes of a player fol-
lowing the rules of probability theory. We suppose that
a player gains a payoff by advising a referee of the pa-
rameters of the decision tree probability space (p, q, r)
to optimize a given nonlinear random function. The ref-
eree uses these parameters to determine the value of the
function and provides a payoff equivalent to this value.
(If desired, the referee could estimate the probability pa-
rameters by using indicator functions and observing an
ensemble average of decision tree outcomes.)
There are many possible random functions which we
could use, and some are listed in Table I. We could choose
any relation of the form f = 0 where probability theory
shows ∇f = 0 and game theory has ∇f 6= 0. Therefore
∇f is effectively a discrepancy vector. We focus on the
squared magnitude of the length of the discrepancy vec-
tor and examine functions of the form F = 1 − |∇f |2.
Immediately, probability theory will optimize this func-
tion at the point F = 1 while game theory will locate an
optimum at F < 1. In particular, we choose
f = Pxy(0, 0) + Pxy(1, 1) (33)
so
F = 1− ∣∣∇ [Pxy(0, 0) + Pxy(1, 1)] ∣∣2
= 1− ∣∣∇ [1− q + p(q + r − 1)] ∣∣2. (34)
In the unconstrained behavioural space PB, a rational
player will evaluate this as
F = 1− (1 − q − r)2 − (1− p)2 − p2. (35)
In turn, this will be maximized at points p = 12 and
q + r = 1 to give a maximum payoff of Fmax =
1
2 .
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A contrasting result is obtained using the isomorphism
constraints of probability theory where our player faces
the optimization problem
maxF = 1− ∣∣∇ [1− q + p(q + r − 1)] ∣∣2
subject to ρxy = ρ, ∀ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. (36)
Our player might commence by adopting the constraint
ρxy = 1 implemented by (q, r) = (0, 1) to give
maxF = 1−
∣∣∇ [1− q + p(q + r − 1)] ∣∣2∣∣∣
(q,r)=(0,1)
= 1. (37)
This analysis leads to an optimum point at arbitrary p
and (q, r) = (0, 1) and a maximum payoff of Fmax = 1.
Self-evidently, the player would cease their optimization
analysis at this point as the achieved maximum can’t be
improved.
Of course, there are many random functions defined
over decision trees which produce identical results when
using or not using isomorphic constraints. We now briefly
illustrate this using polylinear expected payoff functions,
and consider optimizing the function
max〈Π〉 = 2〈x〉+ 3〈y〉 − 4〈x〉〈y〉.
subject to ρxy = ρ, ∀ρ ∈ [−1, 1] (38)
over the decision tree of Fig. 6. Of course, simple inspec-
tion will locate the optimum at (〈x〉, 〈y〉) = (0, 1) giving
an expected payoff of 〈Π〉 = 3. However, we step through
the process for later generalization to strategic games.
There are an infinite number of correlation constraints
to be examined, but several are straightforward. When
the variables are perfectly correlated at ρxy = 1 via the
constraint (q, r) = (0, 1), we have 〈x〉 = 〈y〉 = 〈xy〉 giving
〈Π〉 = 〈x〉. (39)
This is optimized by setting 〈x〉 = 1 giving an expected
payoff of 〈Π〉 = 1. Conversely, when ρxy = 0 and x and
y are independent as occurs when using the constraint
r = q, then the expectations are separable giving 〈xy〉 =
〈x〉〈y〉 and
〈Π〉 = 2〈x〉+ 3〈y〉 − 4〈x〉〈y〉. (40)
As the 〈x〉 and 〈y〉 variables are independent, a check
of internal stationary points and the boundary leads to
an optimal point at (〈x〉, 〈y〉) = (0, 1) and an expected
payoff of 〈Π〉 = 3.
More general correlation states require use of, for in-
stance, standard Lagrangian optimization procedures.
However, we here adopt a numerical optimization ap-
proach by first using the correlation constraint to write
the r variable as a function of p, q and the correlation
constant ρ, r = r+(p, q, ρ)—see Eq. B1. The constraint
0 ≤ r ≤ 1 places limits on the permissible values of (p, q)
and these are detailed in Eqs. B2 and B3. The problem
is then solved using a a typical Mathematica command
line of [13]
NMaximize[{inRange[r+(p, q, ρ)]×
[2p+ 3q − 3pq − pr+(p, q, ρ)] ,
0 ≤ p ≤ 1 && 0 ≤ q ≤ 1}, {p, q}]. (41)
Here, a suitably defined “inRange” function determines
whether r+ is taking permissible values between zero and
unity allowing the payoff function to be examined over
the entire (p, q) plane. The resulting optimal expected
payoffs follow:
ρ (p, q, r) 〈Π〉
+1 (1., 0., 1.) 1.
+0.75 (0.8138, 0.3876, 1.) 1.03032
+0.5 (0.4831, 0.5917, 1.) 1.40068
+0.25 (0.2590, 0.7953, 1.) 2.02693
0 (0., 1., 1.) 3.
−0.25 (0., 1., 0.9378) 3.
−0.5 (0., 1., 0.7506) 3.
−0.75 (0., 1., 0.4386) 3.
−1 (0., 1., 0.) 3.
(42)
Some care must be taken to ensure convergence of the
solutions. This analysis makes it evident that the player
can maximize expected payoffs by choosing a correlation
constraint where x and y is independent (say) allowing
the setting (p, q, r) = (0, 1, 1) to gain a payoff of 〈Π〉 = 3.
Other choices would also have been possible.
We now turn to applying isomorphism constraints to
the strategic analysis of game theory.
V. OPTIMIZING A MULTISTAGE GAME TREE
In this section, we show that the use of isomorphic con-
straints can alter the outcomes of strategic games even
when expected payoff functions are being used. As usual,
we will consider either the behavioural strategy space PB
(Eq. 26) or the isomorphically constrained behavioural
spaces PB|ρxy=ρ for every value of the correlation state
ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
We consider a strategic interaction between two play-
ers over multiple stages as depicted in the behavioural
strategy space of Fig. 6. Here, two players denoted X
and Y seek to optimize their respective payoffs
X : maxΠX(x, y) = 3− 2x− y + 4xy
Y : maxΠY (x, y) = 1 + 3x+ y − 2xy. (43)
We assume that player X chooses the value of x and
advises this to Y before Y determines the value of y.
In the unconstrained behavioural strategy space PB,
this perfect information game is optimized using back-
wards induction to give the pure strategy choices (x, y) =
(0, 1) achieving payoffs of (ΠX ,ΠY ) = (2, 2).
We now consider the constrained behavioural spaces
PB|ρxy=ρ , ∀ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. The two players are non-
communicating and it is generally not possible to use
a single value for the correlation ρ, and this generally
makes the analysis intractable. However, player Y has
total control over the setting of the correlation ρ in three
cases—when ρ = ±1 and ρ = 0. We consider these cases
now. First consider the space PB|ρxy=1 in which the vari-
ables are functionally equal so y = x = xy. In this space
the players face the respective optimization tasks
X : max
x
ΠX(x) = 3 + x
Y : ΠY (x) = 1 + 2x. (44)
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As a result, playerX optimizes their payoff by setting x =
1 giving the outcomes (ΠX ,ΠY ) = (4, 3). In contrast,
in the space PB|ρxy=−1, the variables are functionally
related by y = 1 − x and xy = 0. These constraints
render the optimization tasks as
X : max
x
ΠX(x) = 2− x
Y : ΠY (x) = 2 + 2x. (45)
Here, player X chooses x = 0 to optimize their payoff
leading to the outcomes (ΠX ,ΠY ) = (2, 2). Finally, when
player Y chooses to discard all information about the x
variable, then the variables x and y are independent and
the chosen space is PB|ρxy=0. In this space, there are
no pure strategy solutions and the players will optimize
expected payoffs. We have 〈x〉 = p and 〈y〉 = q and
〈xy〉 = 〈x〉〈y〉 = pq giving the optimization problem
X : max
p
〈ΠX〉 = 3− 2p− q + 4pq
Y : max
q
〈ΠY 〉 = 1 + 3p+ q − 2pq. (46)
The best response functions or equivalent partial differ-
entials are
X :
∂〈ΠX〉
∂p
= −2 + 4q
Y :
∂〈ΠY 〉
∂q
= 1− 2p (47)
locating the optimal point at (p, q) = (12 ,
1
2 ) with ex-
pected payoffs of (〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉) = (52 , 52 ).
At this stage of the analysis, both players have sep-
arately calculated an equilibrium point in three spaces
PB|ρxy=ρ for ρ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and the selection of these
correlation states is solely at the discretion of player Y .
The expected payoffs gained at each of these “local” equi-
librium points can then be compared to obtain a “global”
optimal expected payoff. For convenience, these are sum-
marized here:
ρ (〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉)
−1 (2, 2)
0 (52 ,
5
2 )
+1 (4, 3).
(48)
Based on these results, player Y will then rationally op-
timize their expected payoff by choosing to have their
variables in a state of perfect correlation with ρ = 1 in
the space PB|ρxy=1. Player X , also being a rational op-
timizer will play accordingly to give equilibrium payoffs
of (〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉) = (4, 3).
As noted above, the more general treatment of a strate-
gic game, even one as simple as this one, appears in-
tractable.
VI. CONCLUSION
A rational player must compare expected payoffs
across the mixed strategy space in order to locate equi-
libria. As expectations are polylinear, such comparisons
are mathematically equivalent to calculating gradients
and the issues raised in this paper apply. Further, it
is perfectly possible that rational player might need to
calculate the Fisher information defined in terms of gra-
dients of probability distributions in order to optimize
payoffs. It is perfectly possible that a rational player
might need to optimize an Entropy gradient to maxi-
mize a payoff. It is even possible to define games where
payoffs depend directly on the gradient of a probability
distribution—shine light through glass sheets painted by
players to alter transmission probabilities and make pay-
offs dependent on the resulting light intensity gradients
(call it the interior decorating game). This paper has
shown that rational players working with the standard
strategy spaces of game theory will have difficulties with
these games.
This paper has highlighted two alternate ways to opti-
mize a multivariate function Π(x, y) where x and y might
be functionally related in different ways, y = gi(x) for
different i say. The first approach, common to prob-
ability theory and general optimization theory, consid-
ers each potential functional relation as occupying a dis-
tinct space and approaches the optimization as a choice
between distinct spaces. Any uncertainty about which
space to choose does not leak into the properties of any
individual space. If desired, isomorphic constraints can
be used to embed all these distinct spaces into a single
enlarged space for convenience, but if so, all the proper-
ties of the optimization problem are exactly preserved.
The second approach, common to game theory, holds
that the uncertainty about which functional relation to
choose should appear in the same space as the variables
(x, y). This is accomplished by expanding the size of
the space to include both the old variables x and y and
sufficient new variables (not explicitly shown here) to
contain all the potential functional relations and allow
limy→gi(x)Π(x, y) = Π[x, gi(x)] for all i. This enlarged
space then allows gradient comparisons to be made at
points Π[x, gi(x)] − Π[x, gj(x)] for all i and j to locate
optima. These two approaches can lead to conflicting
optimization outcomes as while these approaches gener-
ally assign the same values to functions at all points,
Π(x, y)|y=gi(x) = limy→gi(x)Π(x, y), (49)
they typically calculate different gradients at those same
points
∇Π(x, y)|y=gi(x) 6= limy→gi(x)∇Π(x, y). (50)
These differences can be extreme when the function
Π(x, y) depends on global properties of the space—the
dimension, volume, gradient, information or entropy say.
In its approach, game theory differs from many other
fields including other fields of economics. For exam-
ple, the Euler-Lagrange equations of Ramsey-type mod-
els consider the functional variation of some function
u[y(x), y′(x)] while ensuring a consistent treatment of the
function y(x) and its gradient y′(x) [14]. Gradients are
not taken in limits in these fields.
Throughout this paper, we have presumed that a ra-
tional player should be able to use standard techniques
from either probability theory or optimization theory on
the one hand, or decision theory and game theory on
the other, and expect all of these methods to provide
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consistent results. We have shown that when consider-
ing multiple, potentially correlated variables, and func-
tions of these variables dependent on the geometry of
the probability parameter space, then these methods can
give rise to contradictory optimization outcomes. We
have suggested decision and game theory are incomplete
when they require the adoption of a single geometry for
any decision or game tree, and that these fields should
consider applying the alternate geometries of probabil-
ity theory and optimization theory. Recognizing that a
single multi-stage decision or game tree can encompass
an infinite number of incommensurate probability spaces
might resolve some of the paradoxes of game theory, and
have broader application.
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Appendix A: Optimization and isomorphic
probability spaces
1. Isomorphic dice
In each respective die space, the gradient operator is
∇ =
n−1∑
i=1
pˆi
∂
∂pi
(A1)
where a hatted variable pˆi is a unit vector in the indicated
direction and we resolve the normalization constraint via
pn = 1−
∑n−1
i=1 pi. For the coin, we have
V =
∫ 1
0
da
∫ 1
0
db δa+b=1
=
∫ 1
0
da
= 1
Ex = −[a log(a) + (1− a) log(1 − a)]
∇Ex = −aˆ log a
1− a . (A2)
For the triangle, the equivalent functions are
V =
∫ 1
0
da
∫ 1
0
db
∫ 1
0
dc δa+b+c=1
=
∫ 1
0
da
∫ 1−a
0
db
=
1
2
Ex = −[a log(a) + b log(b) +
(1 − a− b) log(1− a− b)]
∇Ex = −aˆ log a
1− a− b − bˆ log
b
1− a− b . (A3)
Finally, for the square, we have
V =
∫ 1
0
da
∫ 1
0
db
∫ 1
0
dc
∫ 1
0
dd δa+b+c+d=1
=
∫ 1
0
da
∫ 1
0
db
∫ 1−a−b
0
dc
=
1
6
Ex = −[a log(a) + b log(b) + c log(c) +
(1 − a− b− c) log(1 − a− b− c)]
∇Ex = −aˆ log a
1− a− b− c − bˆ log
b
1− a− b− c
−cˆ log c
1− a− b− c . (A4)
The function F (a, b, c) has a directed gradient in the
direction 1√
2
(1,−1, 0) of
∇F (a, b, c). 1√
2
(1,−1, 0) = V 2 1
2
log
b
a
(A5)
using Eq. A4. At points where (a, b, c) = (a, 1−a, 0) this
gives a directed gradient of
∇F (a, 1− a, 0). 1√
2
(1,−1, 0) = V 2 1
2
log
1− a
a
(A6)
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which is optimized at (a, b, c) = (12 ,
1
2 , 0).
2. Continuous bivariate Normal spaces
Two continuous independent and normally distributed
random variables x and y with respective means µx and
µy and standard deviations σx and σy have joint and
marginal distributions of
Pxy =
1
2piσxσy
e
− 12
[
(x−µx)
2
σ2x
+
(y−µy)
2
σ2y
]
Px =
1√
2piσx
e
− 12
(x−µx)
2
σ2x
Py =
1√
2piσy
e
− 12
(y−µy )
2
σ2y . (A7)
The conditional distribution for x given some value of y
is
Px|y =
1√
2piσx
e
− 12 (x−µx)
2
σ2x . (A8)
Two random normally distributed variables x and y with
correlation value ρ have a joint distribution
P ′xy =
1
2piσxσy
√
1− ρ2 × (A9)
e
− 1
2(1−ρ2)
[
(x−µx)
2
σ2x
− 2ρ(x−µx)(y−µy )
σxσy
+
(y−µy )
2
σ2y
]
.
The marginal distributions for the correlated case are
identical to those of the independent space so P ′x = Px
and P ′y = Py. The conditional distribution for x given
some value of y is
P ′x|y =
1√
2pi(1− ρ2)σx
e
− 1
2(1−ρ2)
(x−µ¯x)
2
σ2x , (A10)
where the new conditioned mean is
µ¯x = µx + ρ
σx
σy
(y − µy). (A11)
In the enlarged distribution space, the gradient operator
is
∇ = ∂
∂x
xˆ+
∂
∂y
yˆ +
∂
∂µx
µˆx +
∂
∂µy
µˆy +
∂
∂σx
σˆx +
∂
∂σy
σˆy +
∂
∂ρ
ρˆ. (A12)
When suitably constrained by an isomorphism, the en-
larged distribution satisfies
∇ [P ′xy − P ′xP ′y]∣∣ρ=0 = 0
∇
[
P ′x|y − P ′x
]∣∣∣
ρ=0
= 0. (A13)
Conversely, when the parameter ρ is not externally con-
strained then these required relations are not held even
in the limit as ρ→ 0 as
lim
ρ→0
∇ [P ′xy − P ′xP ′y] = ρˆ lim
ρ→0
∂
∂ρ
P ′xy 6= 0
lim
ρ→0
∇
[
P ′x|y − P ′x
]
= ρˆ lim
ρ→0
∂
∂ρ
P ′x|y 6= 0. (A14)
Expectations of the x and y variables must also satisfy
certain gradient relations. As expectations integrate over
the x and y variables, the gradient operator is a function
of only five variables now,
∇ = ∂
∂µx
µˆx +
∂
∂µy
µˆy +
∂
∂σx
σˆx +
∂
∂σy
σˆy +
∂
∂ρ
ρˆ. (A15)
We then have
∇ [〈xy〉′ − 〈x〉′〈y〉′]|ρ=0 = 0 (A16)
lim
ρ→0
∇ [〈xy〉′ − 〈x〉′〈y〉′] = ρˆ lim
ρ→0
∂
∂ρ
〈xy〉′ 6= 0.
3. Joint probability space optimization
The gradient operator in the probability space of the
square dice with probability parameters (a, b, c) is
∇ = aˆ ∂
∂a
+ bˆ
∂
∂b
+ cˆ
∂
∂c
, (A17)
where a hat indicates a unit vector in the indicated di-
rection.
a. Perfectly correlated probability spaces
We compare calculations when x and y are perfectly
correlated at points (a, 0, 0, 1 − a) in the isomorphically
constrained space Pcorr and in the non-constrained space
P ′corr.
The joint entropy between x and y is
Exy(a, b, c) = −a log a− b log b− c log c (A18)
−(1− a− b− c) log(1− a− b− c)
giving respective gradients in the Pcorr and P ′corr spaces
of
∇Exy|b=c=0 = −aˆ log
(
a
1− a
)
∇Exy = −aˆ log
(
a
1− a− b− c
)
−bˆ log
(
b
1− a− b− c
)
−cˆ log
(
c
1− a− b− c
)
lim
(bc)→(00)
∇Exy = undefined. (A19)
Equating these gradients to zero locates the maximum at
(a, b, c) = (12 , 0, 0) in Pcorr and at (a, b, c) = (14 , 14 , 14 ) inP ′corr.
Writing (a, b, c) = (p1, p2, p3), the Fisher Information
is a matrix with elements i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with
Fij = (A20)∑
xy
Pxy
(
∂
∂pi
logPxy
)(
∂
∂pj
logPxy
)
.
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When isomorphically constrained in the space Pcorr, the
Fisher Information is Fij |b=c=0 with the only nonzero
term being
F11 = (1− a)
[
aˆ
∂
∂a
log(1− a)
]2
+ a
[
aˆ
∂
∂a
log a
]2
=
1
a(1− a) (A21)
This means that the smaller the Variance the more the in-
formation obtained about a. In the unconstrained space
P ′corr, the Fisher Information is a very different, 3 × 3
matrix.
The likelihood function estimates probability param-
eters from the observation of n trials with na appear-
ances of event (x, y) = (0, 0), nb appearances of event
(x, y) = (0, 1), nc appearances of event (x, y) = (1, 0),
and nd appearances of event (x, y) = (1, 1). We have
na + nb + nc + nd = n, giving the Likelihood function
L = f(na, nb, nc, n)a
nabnbcnc(1− a− b− c)n−na−nb−nc
(A22)
where f(na, nb, nc, n) gives the number of combinations.
The optimization proceeds by evaluating the gradient of
the Log Likelihood function. When isomorphically con-
strained in the space Pcorr, the gradient of the Log Like-
lihood function is
∇ logL|b=c=0 = aˆ
[
na
a
− n− na
1− a
]
, (A23)
which equated to zero gives the optimal estimate at a =
na/n and nb = nc = 0 as expected. Conversely, when
unconstrained in the space P ′corr, the gradient of the Log
Likelihood function evaluates as
∇ logL = aˆ
[
na
a
− n− na − nb − nc
1− a− b− c
]
+bˆ
[
nb
b
− n− na − nb − nc
1− a− b− c
]
+cˆ
[
nc
c
− n− na − nb − nc
1− a− b − c
]
. (A24)
This is obviously a very different result, though at points
(a, b, c) = (a, 0, 0) equating the log Likelihood to zero
locates the same estimate as before of a = na/n and
nb = nc = 0.
In the unconstrained probability space P ′corr, the ex-
pectation, variance, and entropy relations of interest eval-
uate as
〈x〉 − 〈y〉 = c− b
V (x)− V (y) = (c− b)(a− d) (A25)
Ex = − [(a+ b) log(a+ b)+
(1− a− b) log(1− a− b)]
Exy = − [a log a+ b log b+ c log c+
(1− a− b− c) log(1− a− b− c)] ,
which in the limit gives an undefined gradient
lim
(bc)→(00)
∇ [Exy − Ex] = undefined. (A26)
b. Independent probability spaces
For the square die under consideration, we have prob-
abilities and expectations of
Pxy(00)− Px(0) = ad− bc
〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉 = ad− bc
Px|y(0|0)− Px(0) =
ad− bc
a+ c
, (A27)
and entropies of
Ex = −(a+ b) log(a+ b)− (1− a− b) log(1− a− b)
Ey = −(a+ c) log(a+ c)− (1− a− c) log(1 − a− c)
Exy = −a log a− b log b− c log c− d log d, (A28)
giving gradients of
lim
ad→bc
∇ [Exy − Ex − Ey] = (A29)
lim
ad→bc
∇
{
a log
[
d
a
a− ad+ bc
d− ad+ bc
]
+ b log
[
d
b
b+ ad− bc
d− ad+ bc
]
+
c log
[
d
c
c+ ad− bc
d− ad+ bc
]
+ log
[
d− ad+ bc
d
]}
6= 0.
Appendix B: Optimizing simple decision trees
When the correlation (Eq. 30) between x and y is
ρxy = ρ, and as long as both p 6= 0 and p 6= 1, then the
correlation constraint defines two surfaces in the (p, q, r)
simplex at height
r±(p, q, ρ) = (B1)
ρ2 − 2q(1− p)(ρ2 − 1)± ρ
√
ρ2 + 4q(1− q) (1−p)
p
2 [1 + p(ρ2 − 1)] .
The function r+(p, q, ρ) will give the required correlation
surfaces within the simplex. That is, when ρ = 0 we
have r+(p, q, 0) = q as required. Similarly, when ρ = 1
we have r+(p, q, 1) ≥ 1 across the entire (p, q) plane with
the equality r+(p, q, 1) = 1 only where q = 0 or q = 1.
We require ρ = 1 at (q, r) = (0, 1). Finally, when ρ =
−1 and x and y are perfectly anti-correlated, we have
r+(p, q,−1) ≤ 0 across the entire (p, q) plane with the
equality r+(p, q,−1) = 0 only where q = 0 or q = 1. We
require ρ = −1 at (q, r) = (1, 0).
The strict requirement that 0 ≤ r+(p, q, ρ) ≤ 1 es-
tablishes permissible regions on the (p, q) plane. For
0 < ρ < 1, the permissible region is bounded by the
q = 0 line and the line
q(p, ρ) =
p
p+ ρ
2
1−ρ2
. (B2)
Similarly, for −1 < ρ < 0, the (p, q) region is bounded by
the q = 1 line and the line
q(p, ρ) =
1
1 + p 1−ρ
2
ρ2
. (B3)
